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Abstract
As unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) continue to become more readily available, their
use in civil, military, and commercial applications is growing significantly. From aerial
surveillance to search-and-rescue to package delivery the use cases of UAVs are
accelerating. This accelerating popularity gives rise to numerous attack possibilities for
example impersonation attacks in drone-based delivery, in a UAV swarm, etc. In order to
ensure drone security, in this project we propose an authentication system based on RF
fingerprinting. Specifically, we extract and use the device-specific hardware impairments
embedded in the transmitted RF signal to separate the identity of each UAV. To achieve
this goal, AlexNet with the data augmentation technique was employed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) commonly
known as drones fly without a human pilot and are controlled remotely by a remote
controller. Some drones can even fly autonomously. The complete system includes the
controller and communication system in conjunction with sensors and GPS. UAVs have
payloads that are lighter than a person, which allows them to be much smaller. Weaponized
military UAVs are lighter than crewed counterparts with equivalent weapons while
carrying large payloads. Because civilian UAVs lack life critical components, they may be
made of lighter but less durable materials and forms, and their electronic control systems
can be less thoroughly tested [1]. The design of quadcopter is now common for small
UAVs. However, it is rarely utilized for crewed aircraft. UAVs can be classified based on
their weight, altitude, degree of autonomy, and composite criteria.
Lately, UAVs are widely being used for different military, commercial and civilian
applications. They are highly effective while minimizing the overall cost and risks.
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are being developed for a variety of reasons, one of which
is being economical. Smaller vehicles may thus provide a significant advantage in terms of
stealth applications for various defense and security purposes. They are more likely to
make less noise and blend in with their surroundings when appropriately suited to their
surroundings using the well-known method of camouflage. Miniaturization allows for the
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employment of less powerful propulsion systems that would be impossible to utilize in a
crewed aircraft, such as small electric motors, sensors, and battery packs. The main use of
UAVs in the military is for recognition and surveillance missions. Another benefit of
miniaturizing UAVs is that they may fit into extremely narrow spaces such as ventilation
pipes, tunnels, pipelines, collapsed structures, and sewer pipes. Ground vehicles are more
prone to become trapped in such confined areas than flying aircraft. Drones and internet of
things (IoT) technologies have produced new business applications. Drones combined with
on-ground IoT sensor networks may assist agricultural firms in monitoring land and crops,
energy companies in surveying power lines and operating equipment, and insurance
companies in monitoring claims and policies [2]. The most important commercial use of
UAVs is in the agriculture field. Due to resource depletion, farmlands are reduced, and
with the short supply of agricultural labor, there is an urgent need for more convenient and
smarter agricultural solutions than traditional methods as global demand for food
production grows exponentially [1]. Agricultural drones have been utilized in different
farmlands to assist in the development of sustainable agriculture. With the ongoing Covid19 pandemic situation, UAVs are conveniently used for delivering goods.
However, the increasing application space has also led to increased threats and security
breaches some of which are discussed by the authors in [3]. The detection and identification
of UAVs in important for the military and public security. The low flying height and small
radar cross-section of UAVs are the two biggest obstacles to the detection of the UAVs.
Surveillance radar concepts against UAVs are often based on mechanical rotating antenna
concepts that are mounted on high observation locations such as the tops of buildings or
steeples. In a city with numerous high buildings, the situation becomes worse, especially

3

when towering structures block the line of sight. Various companies and research
organizations are using Class 1 UAVs to combat the danger [4]. In a high-dynamic
environment, these concepts are much time taking, and based on the exhibiting effects,
they are too expensive to deploy on a large scale.
Since UAVs are limited in computational and energy resources, RF fingerprinting methods
for the secure detection/authentication of UAVs are gaining traction from the research
community. RF fingerprinting is a physical layer (PHY) method that helps in detecting
transmitter-generated features (noises) at the receiver side [5].

Because of random

hardware noise and dynamic multipath reflection in interior situations, achieving
decimeter-level accuracy with commodity technology is difficult. When we convert our
analog signal to a digital signal using DAC, some sort of noise is added to the signal. Noise
affects the phase of the signal. We can further use this phase offset as a fingerprint of the
UAV. RF fingerprinting with deep neural networks has shown tremendous potential for
the detection of static UAVs but there is not much work has been done for flying UAVs.
Moreover, the UAVs hovering introduces complex variations between the transmitter and
the receiver, which should be taken into the account for solving the problem. Different
machine learning (ML) algorithms were also introduced to learn the hardware features of
the UAVs in order to detect them. In this work, we are applying a customized Alexnet
neural network for the UAV classification. Alexnet uses multiple convolutional filters with
different sizes to fully extract the features from the input signals. Due to the dense
convolutional approach of the model, Alexnet proves itself very promising in high accuracy
hovering UAV classification. The trained model was tested in different scenarios which
included testing on same bursts as in training data as well as testing on unseen bursts which
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did not appear in training data. One vs all approach was applied while training. Results
show that the proposed model can achieve an identification accuracy of 85%.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Physical layer security techniques have been widely investigated for WiFi devices [6-8].
In [6], the author presented a study in which their team evaluated the performance of
802.11n in a practical environment, Performance of the module which uses spatial
diversity, spatial multiplexing, and channel characteristics were observed under different
testing scenarios. In their testing scenario, they used 3x3 MIMO (Multiple-Input MultipleOutput) along with RF equipment to measure the received signal values. According to the
author, increasing the number of antennas to three resulted in improved MIMO gain up to
2.2x. Furthermore, they reported that spatial diversity also improved the overall MIMO
gain. They compared 2x3 configuration with 3x3 and 2x3 outperformed the other one. 2x3
configuration runs faster on more than three-quarters of the links. Modern NIC report CSI
information that has embedded hardware noise along with the channel gains. This CSI is
exploited by many researchers for security. In [7], a novel CFO-based WiFi device
fingerprinting mechanism along with CFO estimation using CSI was proposed. The authors
proposed a solution to overcome the long-standing threats such as network freeloading and
rogue APs. The author proposed a readily deployable solution based on Channel State
Information (CSI) and Carrier Frequency Offsets (CFO). This solution does not require
any changes on access points and network infrastructure. The proposed solution predicts
the CFO of wireless devices from their CSI only. Since CFO is purely based on oscillator
drifting and it changes continuously, it is embedded in the transmitted signal and added to
the received phase of the signal. Therefore, CFO cannot be manipulated very easily. They
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performed a variety of experiments and tests on 23 phones and 34 access points. The author
reported that their proposed solution can detect attacks with 93% accuracy. Over the last
decade, many studies have proven themselves for the precise indoor WiFi device location
for emergency applications. These WiFi devices have the benefit of being low cost and
minimal complexity. There is a lot of interest and research for exploiting WiFi technology
like the 802.11n standard for indoor localization. In this paper, the authors [8], provide a
brief literature review of the recent WiFi localization devices, mainly targeting their pros
and cons, technical details, and future work. Due to the fewer number of antennas, WiFi
devices suffer from non-trivial phase noise. This can be minimized by using spatial
smoothing, which helps in decreasing the correlation by averaging the signal from
incoming antennas. Other techniques include using wired communication to cancel the
errors, channel reciprocity, use of large distance to remove antenna coupling, and complex
conjugate method to cancel the errors. All above WiFi-based research demonstrates that
physical layer security is a promising security tool and is particularly useful for resourceconstrained cyber-physical systems such as UAVs.
UAVs are widely employed in military and civilian industries due to their tiny size, low
cost, and high versatility. They face cyber dangers in addition to the broad applications of
UAVs and the tremendous growth of information technologies. False spoofing is a
common cyber-attack among them. If this attack hits UAVs, it could cause property
damage as well as the disclosure of private information or confidential documents. The
author here [9], proposed Double Shortcuts Zero-Bias Residual Network. is a UAV
anomalous data detection system with a modest store capacity and low time complexity. It
is created by merging residual blocks with double shortcuts and a fully linked Zero-Bias
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(ZB) layer for anomaly detection. The detection accuracy of the Double Shortcuts ZBResNet model is enhanced by roughly two percentage points when compared to the
experimental findings of the upgraded Convolutional Neural Networks with ZB layer. In
paper [10], the author presents a framework for sequential and time-dependent
abnormalities detection. Regarding classification borders and abnormalities, the author
investigated the latent space features of zero-bias neural networks. Then, they showed how
to convert zero-bias DNN classifiers into performance-assured binary abnormality
detectors using a unique technique. Finally, they present a sequential Quickest Detection
(QD) technique that uses the converted abnormality detector to offer the theoretically
ensured lowest abnormal event detection delay under false alarm limits. They test the
framework's usefulness in aircraft communication systems and simulation utilizing real
huge signal recordings.

Thus, recently UAV security using physical layer is gaining importance and a wide variety
of UAV detection and classification methods have been proposed [11–13]. In [11], the
author overviewed the trajectory design, communication protocols, resource allocation,
cooperative UAVs and their wireless communication. They proposed MIMO and
millimeter wave UAV system for improved communication security and better system
spectral efficiency. They did a comprehensive analysis on NOMA(Non-Orthogonal
Multiple Access), Beamforming, and mmWave techniques which enhances the
performance of physical layer security. UAVs integration to the future 5G wireless cellular
network will bring a lot of benefits for UAVs and the telecommunication industry. UAVs
can be used as new mobile aerial platforms in the cellular network to provide

8

communication services for ground users, or will serve as aerial users for the ground base
stations. Aerial wireless networks however are more prone to jamming or eavesdropping
by malicious ground nodes and also impersonation attacks by malicious UAVs in the aerial
wireless network [12]. The authors in [12] analyzed Ground-to-Air and Air-to-Ground
UAV networks and proposed different solutions with their own pros and cons to address
the above mentioned challenges with aerial wireless networks. The techniques proposed
include 3D beamforming, UAV coordination, utilizing UAV mobility. 3D beamforming
requires a large antenna at UAV; UAV coordination requires signaling overhead while
leveraging UAV mobility which adds to more energy propulsion and consumption. In
another research work [13], the authors analyzed physical layer security of Air-to-Ground
UAV and derived an expression for Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) for analyzing the
security of a network numerically. This work considers the security of a Network Flying
Platform (NFP) which communicates with the ground nodes in the presence of single or
multiple eavesdroppers. SOP expressions are used to analyze the level of security in the
case of standard and beamforming wireless communication networks for single or multiple
eavesdroppers. The beamforming communication network proved to be more effective to
counter eavesdropping but the overhead cost for beamforming must be considered. In [14],
the authors leverage phase differences between multiple RF chains within the same
receiver. The relative difference between the different RF transmitter oscillators over a
MIMO (Multi-Input Multi-Output) network was used as a distinguishing feature or
fingerprint. The authors showed through experiments that phase difference remains stable
over time and frequency thus it can be used as a distinguishing trait. This requires hardware
to measure phase difference and was done under specific conditions. This approach
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introduced in the paper showed promise in case of wired networks achieving accuracy of
97% in identifying the transmitter network interface cards (NICs), but the accuracy reduced
in the case of wireless transmissions and under mobile conditions. Neural Networks have
also shown promising results in RF fingerprinting. The authors in [15] used Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) for identifying and verifying wireless transmitters. A CNN
architecture VGG16 was modified for fingerprinting wireless transmitters. The model was
trained on 5 wireless transmitters, and they achieved an accuracy of 99.7%. The data used
for the training purposes was synthetic, so it requires further improvements for real-world
application.
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are gaining popularity worldwide, especially in the
United States. UAS are well used for safety concerns and enable more successful scientific
research. However, UAS poses a threat due to increased reliance on computer and
communication-based technology, jeopardizing the national security, safety, and privacy
of the public [16]. A counter-UAS (C-UAS) system is capable of disabling, interrupting,
or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or UAS legally and safely. In recent years,
import researches have been done on C-UAS, based on acoustic, passive, vision, radar, or
data fusion; and state of the art mitigation technologies. A typical system would have two
subsystems: one for detection to detect, stalk, and identify the UAS, while also having a
minimal footprint and supporting automated functions and location services. The second
subsystem is mitigation for legal and safe control of UAS, with little collateral damage and
minimum cost. The need for a detection and mitigation system is explained by discussing
the different safety, security, and public threats. Therefore, it is to be believed that an
integrated system capable of identifying and mitigating UAS will be critical to their safe
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integration into the airspace system. The development of aviation revolutionized the way
we explore the globe [17]. Planes present us with the excess of new options for completing
tough jobs. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones have grown in popularity as a way to
reduce the risk to human pilots while completing difficult operations. The cost and
difficulty of building highly agile UAVs have both decreased considerably. Different
privacy, public safety, and security issues have arisen as a result of the simplicity with
which drones may be flown. To solve this problem, the dual approach: detection and
eviction are proposed. Using the SDR receivers, the system initially searches the channels
often utilized by uninvited drones in the surveillance region. We can identify the uninvited
drone's telemetry control and video streaming channel using pattern recognition
algorithms. A piece of warning information is communicated into its analog video
streaming channel to depart the drone from the observation region. The other solution will
be to disable the drone's telemetry channel and activate its return strategy. The next step is
to decode the UAV's telemetry channel's baseband symbols using a raw SDR classifier. If
the decoding operation is regarded as successful the landing commands are put into the
UAV's control channel. Some of the challenges of the proposed approach are the relevance
of acoustic detection on high SIR, sensitivity to Gaussian noise. The SVM-based classifier
is sensitive to bit error rate.
UAVs are also used for indoor applications like asset tracking and surveillance and require
accurate location/position estimation. Global positioning system (GPS) is either
unavailable or has weak received signal strength and hence cannot be used for indoor
applications. To properly land in indoor aprons, GPS is required for coordination.
Therefore, we need some non-GPS-based solutions to succeed in dealing with these

11

problems. Vision-based solutions are being used to overcome the problem, but they don’t
perform well due to the poor illumination and relative positioning instead of global
positions. To cater to this problem, WiGig Beam Fingerprinting based positioning system
was proposed by the author [18]. WiGig devices are assumed to be low powered and offthe-shelf devices for short distance communications. In the proposed approach, location
fingerprint is estimated by the beam patterns of low power WiGig. To eliminate the
possibility of error, a weighted K-nearest neighbor algorithm is used in the positioning
process. In other experiments, the position localization errors at the 90th percentile are less
than 1m. The authors in [19] used a machine learning method which focuses on the
transmission delay and packet size of encrypted Wi-fi traffic for UAV detection and
operation mode identification. Features are extracted using only the size of packet and
inter-arrival packet delay. Packet size and inter-arrival packet delay vary from vendor to
vendor due to vendor-specific implementation of UAV command control and video
streaming protocols. Operation mode which can be standby, hovering, or flying, etc. also
affects the relevant features. The machine learning model was optimized for feature
selection as well as prediction within one model using one objective function. Experimental
results showed that the proposed methods could detect and identify tested UAVs within
0.15-0.35s with a maximum accuracy of 95.2%. The UAV detection range is within the
range of 70m and 40m in the line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) scenarios
respectively. Another proposed framework AirID [20], uses Deep Convolutional Neural
Network to identify UAVs based on I/Q samples transmitted by different UAV
transmitters. Software Defined Radios (SDR) mounted on UAVs were used to transmit
signals to the ground receiver. CNN model was trained on this data to detect and identify
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UAVs. Impairment(fingerprints) were added to the data post-training to test the robustness
of the model. Real world experiments were performed in a 100 sq ft area and the model
achieved an accuracy of 98% for the classification of UAVs. Another work in [21],
provided a framework to perform UAV detection and Classification by splitting the raw
signals into frames and then converting them into wavelet domain. This reduced bias of
the signal and the size of data to be processed. Features selected from the energy-time
domain and Naïve Bayes approach were used for the detection of UAVs. K-nearest
neighbor (KNN) was used to classify the UAV while achieving an accuracy of 96%. These
tests were performed on synthetic data generated by Monte Carlo simulations. In another
work [22], the authors performed the detection and classification of UAVs in the presence
of Wi-fi and Bluetooth interference. A multistage detector was used to detect UAV
controller signal from background noise and interference signals. After detecting the UAV
controller signal, it is classified using k-nearest neighbor (KNN) model. Neighborhood
Component Analysis (NCA) was used to reduce the irrelevant features from data. Tests
were performed at 25 SNR to achieve an accuracy of 98.13%.
In this work [23], the authors proposed the WiFi-based approach using statistical
fingerprinting analysis for the detection of aerial devices. Different features related to UAV
controller and video transmission are extracted from the WiFi network. All traffic flows
are captured by the WiFi channels. The acquired data are then pre-processed and sent to
global traffic capture to extract the key features of the UAV. The performance of the
proposed solution is tested in different cases and reported with an average precision greater
than 96 %. Thus, the identification and detection of illegal drones have become a huge
challenge for researchers. In this paper [24], the authors proposed a hierarchical learning-
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based approach for the detection and identification of UAVs. The detection system consists
of a UAV controller and two receivers to record the signal strength from the UAV. The
first receiver records the lower band RF signals, and the second receiver records the high
band RF signals. The collected RF signals are processed using the LabVIEW software. The
generated dataset is used to train the proposed method for detection and identification. The
data is pre-processed again before the hierarchical learning approach. The filtering process
is used to eliminate the noises, conflicts and to reduce the data size. Total four classifiers
are used, the first classifier looks into the presence of UAV, the second classifier helps to
detect the type of UAV, and the last two classifiers are used to define the modes of Bebop
and AR. The reported classification accuracy of this approach is nearly 99%. The use of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the urban setting has grown which increases the
security risk and difficulty in managing airspace resources. To resolve these issues, the
positioning of UAVs technology is used. Although the time of arrival (TOA)-based
location technology is extensively utilized because of its great precision, its effectiveness
in an urban setting may be hampered by severe multipath and (NLOS)non-line-of-sight
propagation. The authors in [25], proposed a two-stage machine learning detecting method
and used ray tracing simulation to build the multipath fingerprinting dataset. Ray tracing
simulation provides the channel impulse response of the site and all the reflection and
scattering points of the paths. The coarse positioning with the random forest is proposed to
increase the distance between the labels. It helps in locating the UAV region. The next
stage is the fine positioning in the neural network, where networks are trained to predict
the precise position of the UAVs. They demonstrate through simulation that the method
placement error is less than 16 m for 90 % of cases.
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Moreover, for extracting communication channel characteristics of UAVs, the author [26],
proposed empirical mode decomposition (EMD) and ensemble empirical mode
decomposition (EEMD) methods. To train machine learning model for RF pattern
recognition, intrinsic mode functions (IMF) are used as features. The author used EMD
and EEMD signal decomposition for micro UAS classification and detection. Since each
intrinsic mode function has its own frequency domain components which are used for
communication between UAV and its remote controller. The pattern formed by these IMF
is used to classify different UAVs with quite a good accuracy. The introduction of EMD
and EEMD results in a denoising effect which improved overall classification accuracy. In
the paper [27], the author proposed a time domain based multiple UAV classification-based
model. In the proposed algorithm, transient signal and video signal are converted to time
domain using short time Fourier transform. To remove unwanted and redundant dimension
features, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique is used to reduce the dimension
of given data. Support Vector Machine (SVM) and K-Nearest Neighbor algorithms (KNN)
are trained on this rectified data. Author reported 98% accuracy for the SVM model. The
Internet of Things (IoT) is quickly becoming an integral part of daily life, enabling a wide
range of new services and applications. The prevalence of rogue IoT devices, on the other
hand, has exposed the IoT to untold dangers with grave implications. Detecting rogue IoT
devices and identifying authentic ones is the first step in safeguarding the IoT. The authors
divide IoT device detection and identification into four categories in their paper [28]:
device-specific pattern recognition, Deep Learning enabled device identification,
unsupervised device identification, and anomalous device detection. From the standpoint
of machine learning, the author analyzed existing non-cryptographic IoT device
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identification technologies and identified several major emerging themes, including
continuous learning, abnormality detection, and deep unsupervised learning. The rise of
relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles has resulted from the advancement of new
technologies. Concerns about privacy, public safety, and security have been raised as a
result of these UAVs. Inadequate control over UAVs that reach critical locations is one
concern posed by unauthorized UAV operation. An acoustic technique can be used to
detect the presence of a UAV in one approach. In paper [29], the authors have recognized
that and suggested some techniques to cater to these issues. To identify the appearance and
estimate the position of unknown UAVs, a wireless distributed acoustic sensor network
can be deployed. Furthermore, a software-defined radio (SDR) can apply machine learning
techniques to recognize and decode the unauthorized UAV's telemetry protocols. Acoustic
techniques may have a restricted detection range and may not be able to give spatial
localization of a detected UAV, especially in three dimensions. In paper [30], the author
proposed an approach using the UAV position. In this approach, UAVs may be required to
send their positions via a standardized protocol or beacon, such as the Automated
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). However, such an approach is not without its
drawbacks. Deep Learning (DL) is widely used in the Internet of Things (IoT). Applying
deep neural networks to IoT devices results in a new generation of apps capable of
complicated sensing and recognition tasks, allowing humans to interact with their physical
surroundings in new ways [31-33]. Non-cryptographic Device Identification (NDI) is one
of the DL-based IoT applications. Various Incremental Learning algorithms are used in the
NDI system. The major drawback of IL algorithms is their extensive storage requirement
which is not suitable for IoT devices, and their performance degrades when historical data
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is not available. To address the issues, different suggestions have been proposed. First, a
new metric, Degree of Conflict for quantifying the topological maturity of DNN models is
introduced. Then, to explain the catastrophic forgetting in DNN models, a novel
perspective on causation the “Conflict of fingerprints” is presented. The enhanced IL
scheme, Channel Separation Enabled Incremental Learning (CSIL) is designed for the
wireless identification system. The proposed framework is evaluated with real
data “Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast”. The result accurately identifies the
IoT devices and can be generalized to the medical domain such as virus detection.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Dataset Gathering:
The UAV dataset was gathered from [1]. For the data generation, atotal of 7 UAVs were
used in experiments. To avoid any signal disturbance and interface, UAV experiments were
done in an RF anechoic chamber. For the testing, DJI M100 drones were used as
transmitter. In the receiving end, high-performance USRP X310 boards were used. In the
dataset, 4 pairs of distances were used. UAVs flew at 6,9,12,15 ft distance from the
receiver. Different experiments were done at these specific distances. In the experiment, 2
sec data of each UAV was recorded with a pause of 10 sec respectively. This process was
repeated 3 times to avoid any noise and outlier value. That 10s pause interval is used as the
separation between intervals. In 2s data, there are 140 signals which were sent to the
receiver from the transmitter. These 140 signals are labeled as a Burst. Single UAV sends
4 bursts in a single communication. Visual representation is shown in Figure1. There are
almost 13000 experiments data in total. Raw signals are saved in binary format in the IQ
form. Each experiment has its own metadata file which contains details about the
experiment [34].

Figure 1. I/Q samples collected from a set of UAVs at a certain distance [34]
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3.2 Dataset Preprocessing:
Dataset is split into training, validation, and test sets depending on different strategies
which will be explained in a later section. Next, we calculate the mean µ and standard
deviation σ for the whole dataset in a preprocessing step. This mean and standard deviation
are used to normalize the training and test batches. Neural Network is trained on the slices
of examples which are non-overlapping portions of examples and contain consecutive raw
I/Q samples. Data batches were prepared with a slice size of 200 using the Data Generator
class of Keras library. During training, random set of examples are loaded in memory and
random slices are extracted from these examples which results in shuffling of training set
without loading all of it into memory. This provides more variation of the training set to be
observed by the model, resulting in a more robust model. Slices equal to “batch size” are
selected from different examples to form a batch with I/Q samples separated into two
channels forming a tensor with dimension (batch size, 200, 2). This tensor is then
normalized using mean µ and standard deviation σ calculated previously as shown below
before feeding the data into the model for training:
𝑋!"#$%&'()* =

+,.

[35]

Before training the model, data examples were partitioned based on the distance of UAVs
from receiver. For each partition, 7 separate datasets were created where each dataset was
designed to identify a specific UAV from the rest. This partition of data caused an
imbalance in training data which means that there was a large difference in positive
examples as compared to negative examples. This imbalance results in the overfitting of
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the model on more abundant examples. To overcome this problem, slices from an equal
number of positive and negative examples were sampled for each batch during training.

3.3 Neural Network Training, Validation & Testing
For the neural net, modified 1D AlexNet with ~1.1 million parameters were used as shown
in Fig. 2. The modified version of AlexNet1D consists of 5 blocks of 1D Convolution
layers stacked together. Each block consists of three layers which include a 1D
convolutional layer with 128 filters and size 7 followed by another 1D convolutional layer
with 128 filters and size 5. A MaxPooling layer is attached at the end of each block. These
blocks are followed by 2 Fully Connected (FC) layers with layer sizes of 256 and 128
respectively. The final layer FC layer consists of a single neuron for binary classification.

Figure 2. Neural Network Architecture for AlexNet 1D with ~1.1M parameters

The neural network was trained to identify one UAV from the rest. So, binary cross-entropy
loss was used to train the model with Adam optimizer. A learning rate of 0.0001 was used
for training. After each epoch, the neural network was tested on the validation set. After
training, the model was tested on a test set. Equal slices were sampled from positive and
negative examples for the test set to get balanced accuracy same as during training. Each
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slice was normalized with previously recorded mean and standard deviation before being
fed into the model.
The model was trained for two scenarios.
Scenario 1 - Training on all bursts and testing on all bursts: In this scenario, the dataset
was first shuffled and then split into sequences of 60%, 20%, and 20% for training,
validation, and test for each distance, UAV, and each burst. The data was shuffled to allow
neural the network to go through the data in multiple variations every epoch so that it can
be trained more robustly against noise. The data is split into train and validation to monitor
if the model is overfitting during training.
Scenario 2 - Training on 1,2, 3 bursts and testing on 4th burst: For this case, the model
was trained on bursts 1,2,3 with 90% for the training set and 10% for the validation set.
After training, the model was tested on burst 4. This scenario was performed to measure
the effects on accuracy in case there is an unseen burst in test data that did not appear during
training.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation and Results
We have gathered from 7 different UAVs at 4 different distances. After the data gathering,
processing was done on the raw collected dataset. Different bursts of the signal were
created using a single raw signal. 1D Alexnet was trained with two scenarios. In 1st
scenario, all the burst data was divided into two parts. One data part was used for training
the model while the other was used for testing. In 2nd scenario, the first 3 bursts were used
for training while the last burst was used only for testing. Following are the results for
Alexnet1D trained on all bursts and tested on all bursts.
Results Scenario 1 (4 burst of data was shuffled, then divided into training,
validation, and testing):
Scenario 1 & distance 6 ft

Test Accuracy = 70.3%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 70.7%

(b) UAV 2
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Test Accuracy = 72.3%

Test Accuracy = 78.7%

(c) UAV 3

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 70%

Test Accuracy = 70.5%

(e) UAV 5

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 72.3%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 3. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 6 ft and scenario 1.

The above results show that the accuracy of the model on test data at 6ft distance remains
above 70% consistently as the bursts 1, 2, 3 and 4 appear in train as well as test data. Since
the data is shuffled the variation caused by the channel is shuffled and hence the training,
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validation and testing are equally impacted. Because of this, we can see that the training
and testing accuracies are similar. Also, for the shorter distance of 6 ft the signal to noise
ration (SNR) is higher yielding larger test accuracy.

Scenario 1 & distance 9ft

Test Accuracy = 70.8%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 75.8%

(c) UAV 3

Test Accuracy = 74.4%

(e) UAV 5

Test Accuracy = 75.3%

(b) UAV 2

Test Accuracy = 73.1%

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 79.9%

(f) UAV 6
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Test Accuracy = 69.4%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 4. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 9 ft and scenario 1.

We can see from Figure 4. that the accuracy remains high for all UAVs when the
distance increases from 6ft to 9ft. Again, the reason is high SNR and well shuffled data
across training validation and testing.
Scenario 1 & distance 12 ft

Test Accuracy = 65.9%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 87.5%

(c) UAV 3

Test Accuracy = 79.6%

(b) UAV 2

Test Accuracy = 72.3%

(d) UAV 4
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Test Accuracy= 69.8%

Test Accuracy 70.3%

(e) UAV 5

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 5. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 12 ft and scenario 1.

The results in Figure 5. demonstrates that when the distance between the transmitter and
receiver is increased to 12 ft, the accuracy remains high (around 79%, see Figure 5) for
most of the UAVs when we train on all bursts.
Scenario 1 & distance 15 ft

Test Accuracy = 71.1%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 68%

(b) UAV 2
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Test Accuracy = 69.6%

Test Accuracy = 66%

(c) UAV 3

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 76.8%

Test Accuracy = 68.8%

(e) UAV 5

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 99.8%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 6. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 15 ft and scenario 1.

When the distance was increased to 15ft, as can be seen in Figure 6., the accuracy for UAV
UAV7 was quite high as compared to other cases. This happens because there is only 1
example in the dataset for UAV7 at distance 15ft. Because of which, the model overfits on
negative examples. The neural network predicts all examples as negative, and it results in
high accuracy because nearly all the examples in the test set are negative resulting in high
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test accuracy. For all different UAV distances, the learning rate of 0.001 was used to allow
the model to converge faster.

Results Scenario 2 (3 burst of data was shuffled, then divided into training,
validation and 4th burst was used for testing):

Scenario 2 & distance 6 ft

Test Accuracy = 60.5%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 53.5%

(c) UAV 3

Test Accuracy = 41.3%

(b) UAV 2

Test Accuracy = 52.3%

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 61.1%
Test Accuracy = 63.2%

28

(e) UAV 5

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 40.9%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 7. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 6 ft and scenario 2.

As the results in Figure 7. demonstrate, for the second scenario and distance 6ft, we trained
on 1, 2, 3 burst and tested on new burst 4. This resulted in lower accuracy (around 50% or
below) as compared to scenario 1. This difference is since the channel noise during the
training and testing are different. The wireless channel is very dynamic and the assumption
that the channel data is coherent during the training and testing is invalid.
Scenario 2 & distance 9 ft

Test Accuracy = 41.5%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 88.8%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(b) UAV 2
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Test Accuracy = 48.7%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

Test Accuracy = 80%

%

Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(c) UAV 3

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 53.5%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

Test Accuracy = 64.9%

%

Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(e) UAV 5

%

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 58.6%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 8. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 9 ft and scenario 2.

Like distance of 6 ft, the accuracy for distance of 9 ft for scenario 2 is low as seen in
Figure 8. Again, training on 1, 2, 3 burst resulted in accuracy of 50 % for most of the
UAVs. The reason being when we test on unseen burst i.e., on new samples the channel
will have dramatically changed as compared to samples used for the training of the
model.
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Scenario 2 & distance 12 ft

Test Accuracy = 26.9%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(a) UAV 1

(b) UAV 2

Test Accuracy = 74.7%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

Test Accuracy = 28.2%

%

Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(c) UAV 3

%

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy 32.6%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

Test Accuracy =74%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

%

(e) UAV 5

(f) UAV 6

Test Accuracy = 66.6%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 9. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 12 ft and scenario 2.
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When the distance was increased to 12 ft, we can see from Figure 9 the accuracy declined.
The identification accuracy decreased to around 30% or below for UAV1, UAV4, and
UAV7 and was higher about 70% for the other UAVs.
Scenario 2 & distance 15 ft

Test Accuracy = 71.2%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(a) UAV 1

Test Accuracy = 42.2%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(b) UAV 2

Test Accuracy = 40.8%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

Test Accuracy = 49%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(c) UAV 3

%

(d) UAV 4

Test Accuracy = 76.2%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

Test Accuracy = 83%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

(e) UAV 5

%

(f) UAV 6
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Test Accuracy = 99.9%
Test Accuracy = 79.8%

%

(g) UAV 7
Figure 10. UAV Identification Accuracy for Distance 15 ft and scenario 2.

We see similar results when the distance was increased to 15 feet for scenario 2. As
illustrated in the above Figure 10. for distance 15 ft and UAV 7 the accuracy was high
about 99.8%. This was surprising and after further investigating, we found that the UAV7
at distance 15 ft had only one example which led to the overfitting on negative examples.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this research work, we capture the complex fingerprints of RF communication modules
within UAVs using the customized deep learning model AlexNet. These captured
fingerprints are then used as a source to classify and identify hovering UAVs. UAVs were
classified in a one-vs-all manner as a binary classification problem. We modified AlexNet
to process 1d I/Q samples from the UAV transmitter communication module. The
fingerprints were extracted for 7 UAVs at distances 6 ft, 9 ft, 12 ft, and 15 ft to capture the
strength, variance, and dynamics of multipath and the constant hovering of the UAVs.
AlexNet was trained based on 2 scenarios. First, the models were trained and tested on all
bursts. Second, the models were trained on bursts 1, 2, 3 and tested on burst 4. Our results
showed that the models trained on all bursts maintain average accuracy of above 70% for
most UAVs and distances. However, training on 1, 2, 3 bursts and testing on burst 4
resulted in lower accuracy (around 50% or below) as compared to the former case.
Moreover, for improve our results we trained models with higher number epochs and
various learning rates. On other hand, for not improved results dataset for specific UAV
was insufficient to train the model since the unbalanced dataset cause overfitting.
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5.2 Future Work
In this work we employed deep learning for drone detection for hovering UAVs. We used
AlexNet to extract the hardware noise features. The large accuracy difference between the
two training scenarios clearly indicate that the network trained on previously collected
dataset performs poorly on the test data set making the extracted fingerprints invalid. The
main reason behind is the continuously changing wireless environment and constant
hovering of the UAVs. This is a fundamental difficulty and is an open research problem
for moving UAVs. We observe following directions for improvements:
•

We will employ multi-classifier deep network models to improve the test accuracy
on unseen bursts. Data Augmentation technique will be employed to make the
model more robust against constantly changing environment.

•

Detection of more drones: our current work detected 7 UAVs, however, in practice
a swarm of drones will have even larger number of UAVs.

•

Large varieties of experiments will be carried out in diverse environment settings
and the validity and robustness of the fingerprints will be evaluated.

•

Lastly, impact of wind, temperature, hardware weathering and speed of drones and
the interference signals on the fingerprint extraction will be researched.
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